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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to develop methods to estimate the option value inherent in a 
multi-year government procurement (MYP), in comparison to a series of single-year 
procurements (SYP).  This value accrues to the contractor, primarily in the form of increased 
revenue stability.  In order to estimate the value, we apply real options techniques1. 
The United States government normally procures weapons systems in single annual lots, or 
single year procurements (SYP). These procurements are usually funded through a 
Congressional Act (the annual National Defense Authorization Act or NDAA) one fiscal 
year at a time. This gives Congress a great deal of flexibility towards balancing long and 
short term demands. For defense contractors, however, the Government’s flexibility results 
in unique difficulties forecasting future sales when demand is driven by both customer 
needs and global politics. 
Defense contractors face risks and advantages that set them apart from commercial 
businesses. Within a contract, the contractor faces a range of execution cost risk: from none 
in a cost plus fixed fee contract to high risk in a firm fixed price contract. The government 
also provides interest-free financing that can greatly reduce the amount of capital a 
contractor a contractor must raise through the capital markets. Additionally the government 
provides direct investment and profit incentives to contractors to invest in fixed assets. The 
net effect is that defense contractors can turn profit margins that may appear low when 
compared to other commercial capital goods sectors, into relatively high return on invested 
capital.  
However, contractors have always faced high inter-contract uncertainty related to the short 
term funding horizon of the government. While the United States Department of Defense 
(DoD) has a multiyear business plan, in any given year, generating a budget entails delaying 
acquisition plans to accommodate changing demands and new information. At the end of 
the cold war, defense firms were allowed unprecedented freedom to consolidate. The 
resulting industrial base is composed of five surviving government contractors: Boeing, 
General Dynamics, Lockheed, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. By diversifying across a 
large number of government customers, these giants with thousands of contracts each have 
taken a giant step towards reducing inter-contract risk—no one contract is large enough to 
                                                 
1 E.g., Amram & Howe (2003) 
Source: Aerospace Technologies Advancements, Book edited by: Dr. Thawar T. Arif,  
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seriously harm the companies if it were canceled for convenience. However, the uncertainty 
around the likelihood of getting the next contract or how large it will be is still there and it is 
particularly important for large acquisition programs. For example, while Lockheed is the 
sole source for the F-22A, they always faced uncertainty in the number of units they will sell 
in the future. For example both the F-22A and the B-2 were originally expected to sell many 
more airplanes to the government than the actual number the government eventually 
purchased. 
Under Title 10 Subtitle A Part IV Chapter 137 § 2306b, the military services can enter into 
multi-year procurement (MYP) contracts upon Congressional approval. There are six criteria 
that must be satisfied, listed in Table 1. The chief benefit for the government has been the 
“price break”, criterion 1, afforded through the operating efficiencies of a long term contract.  
This benefit is readily passed to the government because it funds the necessary working 
capital investments needed to optimize production. It is still possible for the government to 
cancel the MYP contract; however, significant financial barriers such as a cancellation or 
termination liability that make it undesirable to do so. 
 
 Criteria Descriptions 
1 That the use of such a contract will result in substantial savings of the total 
anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts. 
2 That the minimum need for the property to be purchased is expected to remain 
substantially unchanged during the contemplated contract period in terms of 
production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities. 
3 That there is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract 
period the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level 
required to avoid contract cancellation. 
4 That there is a stable design for the property to be acquired and that the technical 
risks associated with such property are not excessive. 
5 That the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance 
through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic. 
6 In the case of a purchase by the Department of Defense, that the use of such a contract 
will promote the national security of the United States.  
Table 1. The Six Criteria for a Multi-Year Procurement2 
The government reaps operational savings by negotiating a lower up-frontprocurement 
price. These savings are achieved through more efficient production lot sizes and other 
efficiencies afforded through better long-term planning not possible with SYP contracts. The 
government can explicitly encourage additional savings by using a cost sharing contract. It 
can implicitly encourage additional savings with a fixed price contract. In the latter case the 
longer contract encourages the contractor to seek further efficiencies since it does not share 
the savings with the government. In fact some might propose this last reason is the best 
reason for a contractor to seek an MYP. 
In addition to the cost savings achieved through more stable production planning horizon, 
we see that the MYP provides the contractor with intrinsic value through the stabilization of 
its medium term revenue outlook. Thus an MYP is also coveted by defense contractors 
because it provides lower revenue risk. What about the possibility that a longer term firm 
                                                 
2 United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 137, Section 2306b 
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fixed price contract exposes the contractor to higher cost risk? This risk is often eliminated 
through economic pricing adjustment (EPA) clauses that provide a hedge against 
unanticipated labor and material inflation. Furthermore, from the criteria in Table 1, MYP 
contracts are only allowed for programs with stable designs that have low technical risk. As 
stated above, it is more likely that the MYP offers the contractor the opportunity to exploit 
the principle-agent information asymmetry and make further production innovations 
unanticipated at contract signing3.   
We believe that the lower risk MYP contract will allow investors to discount contractors’ 
cash flow with a lower cost of capital creating higher equity valuations. From the 
contractors’ perspective, the MYP contract provides a hedge against revenue risk. We can 
estimate the incremental value of the MYP versus the equivalent SYP sequence using option 
pricing methods. Presently the government does not explicitly recognize this risk transfer in 
its contracting profit policy. The government profit policy is to steadily increase the contract 
margin as cost risk is transferred to the contractor. For example a cost plus fixed fee contract 
might have a profit margin of 7% while a fixed price contract, where the contractor is fully 
exposed to the cost-risk, of similar content could have a margin of 12%4.  By limiting some of 
the contractor’s cost-risk exposure, an EPA clause might result in a lower profit margin; 
however, the profit policy makes no mention of an MYP contract, which reduces the 
contractor’s inter-contract risk. And while most of the profit policy is oriented towards 
compensating the contractor for exposing its capital to intra-contract risk and 
entrepreneurial effort, there are provisions designed to provide some compensation for 
exposing capital to inter-contract risk—e.g. the facilities capital markup. The implication is 
that as long as the government does not explicitly price the reduction in cost-risk going from 
a fixed price SYP contact to an MYP contract, the contractor is able to keep the “extra” profit.  
In this paper we present a method to estimate the value an MYP creates for a defense 
contractor in its improved revenue stability. The contractor can use this information in two 
ways. First, the information provides guidance for how much pricing slack the contractor 
can afford as it negotiates an MYP with the government whether or not the latter recognizes 
that better revenue stability has discernable value. Second, if the government tries to reduce 
the contractor’s price based on this transfer of risk, the contractor has a quantitative tool to 
guide its negotiation with the government.  
2. Financial structure and valuation of an MYP 
In this paper, we will present how to estimate the value imbedded in the risk transfer from 
the contractor to the government in an MYP contract using real options analysis. Table 2 
lists recent MYP contracts. Note that while the table mostly shows aircraft the contract type 
can be applied to other acquisitions. Since FY2000, MYP contracts have declined from about 
18 percent of defense procurement to about 10 percent; however, over this period they have 
totaled to about $10 billion per year. These contracts are 3 to 5 times larger than SYP 
contracts and can represent an important portion of the contractor’s revenue.  
                                                 
3 Rogerson, W. P, The Journal of Economic Perspectives ,V. 8, No. 4, Autumn 1994, pp. 65-90 
4 Generally the project with a cost plus contract has higher technical uncertainty than the 
project with the fixed price contract. The government does not expect contractors to accept 
high technical risk projects using a fixed price contract.  
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Program Period Amount ($ Billions) Type of System 
Virginia Class5 2009-2013 $  14.0 Submarine 
CH-47F6 2008-2013       4.3 Aircraft 
V-227 2007-2012     10.1 Aircraft 
F-22A5 2007-2010       8.7 Aircraft 
F-18 E/F5,7 2005-2009       8.8 Aircraft 
DDG-518 2002-2005       5.0 Ship 
AH-1 Apache5,7 2001-2005       1.6 Aircraft 
C-17A5,9 1997-2003     14.4 Aircraft 
Table 2. Recent Major Multi-Year Procurement Contracts 
As an acquisition programmatures, the contractor implicitly receives an option on an MYP 
that is not executable until authorized by the Congress and negotiated by the relevant 
military service. If conditions are met and the option is exercised, the contractor transfers the 
SYP revenue risk to the government, which commits to buying the predetermined number 
of units. There are two financial instruments that approximate this transaction: a put and a 
cash flow swap or exchange option. Both structures provide the protection buyer, i.e. the 
contractor, insurance against losses in the underlying asset, i.e. the net present value of the 
cash flow derived from the sales. For the duration of the MYP contract, the contractor 
receives predictable revenue while the government forgoes the flexibility to defer or cancel 
the procurement by agreeing to pay substantial cost penalties for canceling the MYP 
contract. To value the MYP, we will employ the exchange option of Margrabe10.  From this 
analysis the government will be able to estimate the contractor’s value of transferring 
revenue risk to the government as a function of the size of the contract and the volatility of 
the contract’s value. Since the option is not actively traded, the ultimate negotiated price 
could be heavily influenced by the government and contractor attitudes towards risk.  
3. Real options 
A put option is a common financial contract that gives the owner the right to sell an asset, such 
as a company’s stock, for a pre-determined price on or before a predetermined date. Non-
financial contingent pay-offs that behave like financial options, but are not traded as separate 
securities are called real options. Real options provide the holder of the asset similar risk 
management flexibility though they are not yet sold separately from the underlying asset. For 
example, oil drilling rights give the holder the option, but do not require, exploring, drilling, or 
                                                 
5 Internal publication from Northrop Grumman, “Navy Awards $14 Billion Contract for 
Eight Virginia Class Submarines”, Currents, January 5-9, 2009 
6 Graham Warwick, “Boeing Signs CH-47F Mulityear Deal”, Aviationweek.com, August 26, 
2008 
7 United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions DoD’s Practices and 
Processes for Multiyear Procurement Should be Improved,  GAO-08-298, February, 2008, p. 9 
8 U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Public Affairs), No. 470-02, September 13, 2002. 
9 Second of two multi-year contracts. 
10 Margrabe, W.,  Journal of Finance, 33, 177-86 (1978) 
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marketing the oil to customers. Patents are another example that can be viewed the same way: 
the holder of the patent has the option but is not obliged to deploy the technology. Usually 
these investment flexibilities come into play as contingent pay-offs: they allow the investor to 
delay committing cash until positive pay-off is better assured. Real options capture the 
capability of investors or managers to make valuable decisions in the future. 
More generally, real options analysis captures some of the value of management’s capability 
to make dynamic programmatic changes, based on new and better information, within the 
levers and construct of a given business project. The real-options approach explicitly 
captures the value of management’s ability to limit downside risk by stopping poorly 
performing programs. It also captures the value inherent in the possibility that management 
will exploit unexpected successes. 
An MYP contract contains a real option allowing the contractor a choice to abandon the 
uncertainty associated with relying on sequential SYP contracts to implement the 
government’s acquisition strategy for a weapon system. For example an aircraft 
manufacturer who is the single source for an air vehicle, such as the F-16 or F/A-18, has the 
exclusive option to negotiate an MYP contract to sell the next four lots to the Air Force or 
Navy. Given that most weapons acquisition programs buy fewer units than planned, the 
contractor will exercise the option by entering into an MYP contract.  
The contractor implicitly owns the MYP option as the sole source for the procurement. 
Unlike a financial option which the buyer can choose from a selection of the strike prices 
and tenors, an MYP option does not explicitly exist until the government and contractors 
negotiate the terms of the contract. In negotiating the terms of the MYP, the contractor and 
government are negotiating the option’s strike price—and up to that point it appears as 
though the contractor received the option for free. Once negotiated it is usually executed 
which is like exercising an at-the-money put option. We will define the option parameters 
below, recognizing that they may not be explicitly defined until the option is exercised. 
There are a number of techniques that may be used to value a real option. One way is to 
adapt the framework developed by Black and Scholes11 (BS) for financial options. Real-
options investments are not often framed as neatly as puts and calls on corporate equities 
traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. However, if we can describe the real 
options embedded in an MYP contract along the lines of the appropriate standard options 
framework, we can try to employ the BS option pricing framework. Other alternatives 
include the binomial method12, dynamic programming, simulation, and other numerical 
methods to name a few. 
4. Are real options really used by managers? 
Real options have been a topic of vigorous academic research for decades.  The published 
literature abounds with theoretical papers, and with applications to a wide variety of 
domains. These domains include, for example:  the aerospace13,14, telecommunications15, 
                                                 
11 Black & Scholes (1973) 
12 E.g., Copeland & Tufano (2004) 
13 Richard L. Shockley, J. of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(2), Spring 2007 
14 Scott Matthews, Vinay Datar, and Blake Johnson, J. of Applied Corporate Finance, 19 (2), 
Spring 2007 
15 Charnes et al. (2004) 
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oil16, mining17, electronics18, and biotechnology19 industries; the valuation of new plants and 
construction projects20; real estate21; the analysis of outsourcing22; patent valuation23; the 
analysis of standards24; and the valuation of R&D and risky technology projects25.   
There is some evidence that real-options thinking has permeated the real world in some 
niches.  The technique does appear to be used seriously in the oil industry, for example,26 to 
analyze new ventures.  Perhaps one reason is that it is easier to track the value of the 
underlying asset in that industry than in others.  Reportedly, real options analysis has been 
used at Genentech in all drug development projects since 1995, and Intel has used it to value 
plant expansion27.  Hewlett-Packard reportedly uses a set of risk management tools, 
including real options analysis, in its procurement practices28.  It is perhaps not surprising 
that real options analysis has taken root in engineering and R&D-intensive industries 
engaging in large and risky capital expenditures.  The fact that many of these companies 
have relatively high proportions of engineers and scientists in their management structures 
may also be a contributing factor.  There appears to be a perception that real options 
analysis is inherently more “difficult” than other valuation methods, although this is not 
necessarily the case29.   
Real-options analysis is not as pervasive as conventional discounted cash flow analysis in 
most corporate and government capital budgeting decisions. This alone does not invalidate 
the analysis; it takes decades for analytical tools to take hold or to be changed. Financial 
engineering has become entrenched in the financial services and consulting industries30. As 
these tools evolve it will be natural to apply them to non-financial business problems.  
Indeed the tools are not unique to the financial sector but were adapted from the 
mathematical sciences. The relatively slow penetration of real-options analysis reflects the 
difficulty for most organizations in articulating the risks faced in capital decisions.  
The remainder of this paper will focus on explaining and applying options pricing methods 
to valuing the portion of the MYP contract this is a risk management proposition.  
5. Options theory 
We will use closed form BS-type option pricing methods to estimate the contractor’s value 
in an MYP contract. Financial options fit into the larger domain of derivatives or contingent 
                                                 
16 Cornelius et al. (2005) 
17 Colwell et al. (2003) 
18 Duan et al. (2003) 
19 Ekelund (2005); Remer et al. (2001) 
20 Ford et al (2004); Rothwell (2006) 
21 Fourt (2004); Oppenheimer (2002) 
22 Nembhard et al. (2003) 
23 Laxman & Aggarwal (20030 
24 Gaynor & Bradner (2001) 
25 Paxson (2002); MacMillan et al. (2006) 
26 Cornelius et al. (2005); IOMA (2001) 
27 IOMA (2001) 
28 Maumo (2005) 
29 Amram & Howe (2003); Copeland & Tufano (2004) 
30 Although with mixed results in structured finance and credit default swap applications. 
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claims: financial instruments whose value derives from claims on pay-offs from event-
driven changes in the value of an underlying asset. There are two types of derivatives 
buyers: hedgers who are naturally exposed to the underlying asset volatility and speculators 
who seek exposure to this risk.  
A simple example is an equipment manufacturer with occasional large foreign exchange 
exposures when its machines are exported. The manufacturer could hedge the foreign 
exchange risk by buying put options on the foreign currency he expects to receive upon the 
sales transaction. The put option allows the manufacturer to exchange foreign currency for 
dollars at a predetermined date and exchange rate and thus eliminates profit volatility. The 
manufacturer is the hedger and the bank could be a speculator31. 
Insurance is another example where the insurer (the speculator), sells coverage to insureds 
(hedgers) for a premium. The insurer mitigates its position through many risk management 
tools: setting up loss reserve accounts which are based on detailed loss histories; diligent 
underwriting (i.e. pricing the coverage according to specific risks); avoiding certain risks (i.e. 
correlated high exposure risks such as asbestos, floods, or mold damage); limiting correlated 
risks (i.e. wind damage in Florida or earthquakes in California); hedging through 
reinsurance; etc. The government is actually one of the largest insurers providing many 
types of coverage against risks that many private insurers avoid: flood, nuclear; commercial 
space launch, terrorism, aviation war and hijacking, etc.  
Compared to most risks to which the government is exposed, absorbing a few years of SYP 
volatility is a relatively tame risk transfer particularly in the context of the statutory 
“underwriting” that must occur before Congress will authorize such a contract. In the MYP 
contract, the defense contractor is the hedger, while the government is “speculating” that by 
meeting the MYP criteria it should be able to benefit by accepting the contractor’s risk. The 
MYP criteria in Table 1 are an effective underwriting tool for the government. By passing 
the criteria, the government is actually absorbing little risk since by criteria 2 and 3 they 
would have acquired all of the units even without the MYP.  
It is important to note that not all hedges make good business sense.  The rules as whether 
or not to hedge are based entirely on the cost and benefits to shareholders who are free to 
diversify some of the idiosyncratic risk away from their investment portfolio. The options 
pricing models will not discern this trade-off for the contractors but it is likely to be the basis 
for the contractor’s perspective in negotiating with the government. Regardless of the 
contractors’ risk aversion, our goal is to elucidate the value created by the risk transfer. The 
government is taking on new risk by entering into the MYP contract—this risk transfer 
creates a significant benefit for the contractor counterparty whether or not they want to pay 
for it.  
6. MYP option analysis 
A put option has the desired insurance-like structure of an MYP contract: with the 
embedded risk transfer component of the MYP contract the contractor gains the right to sell 
a fixed number of units at a pre-set price. However, the MYP, like many real options, does 
not strictly eliminate the SYP risk; there is some risk that the government could cancel the 
                                                 
31 The bank may also hedge its foreign exchange exposure. 
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contract or change the number of units32.  Thus an exchange option, which gives the holder 
the right to exchange one cash flow for another on or before a given date, has advantages 
over a put option since its cash flow corresponds more closely to the way an MYP would be 
structured. The put and exchange options are closely related. 
The key difference between the put and the exchange option is that on exercise, a put buyer 
receives a certain cash settlement while with an exchange option the buyer obtains a “cash 
flow” with different volatility. This property is ideal when in fact the MYP contract usually 
has a flexibility clause for variations in quantity (VIQ).  
Consider a put option for the sake of the simplicity of its properties. A put provides a payoff 
to the option holder when it is exercised before the expiry and the exercise price is greater 
than the market or spot price of the underlying asset. An option holder can buy the asset at 
spot price S and sell it at the strike price X and receive a payoff X-S. Alternatively, an option 
holder having a long position in an asset canhedge against losses with puts, much like an 
insurance policy.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Put Pay-off Diagram 
Figure 1 depicts the payoff of a put option on or prior to the expiry. Once exercised, options 
are zero-sum contracts: the writer “loses” and the holder gains or vice versa. If the option 
expires unexercised, the holder’s only loss is the premium paid to the writer. If the put 
option is held as a 1:1 hedge against a long position in the underlying stock, however, the 
net pay-off is nil, ornegative once the option premium is included. In the same way a 
contractor with an MYP contract is hedging against the uncertainty in the government’s 
procurement decisions. The contractor net gain is neutral since the payoff depicted in Figure 
1 is offset by the underlying losses in sales that would have happened if there were no MYP. 
The MYP option pay-off is the protection against losses and the contractor will only observe 
                                                 
32 Canceling the contract usually would come with considerable cost to the government. 
Put Option: right to sell 
asset at X on or before 
T
S=X
Asset Value (S) 
Option value at some time t < T 
Payoff
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that it has stable, predictable cash flows. However, more predictable cash flows allow 
investors to value the contractor’s equity higher. The government, on the other side, faces 
the risk that it will be forced to manage future budget uncertainties by increasing taxes or 
debt, cutting programs other than the MYP, or paying a higher termination fee if it cuts the 
MYP. 
7. Extending financial options to the MYP option 
Ideally we would like to be able to use a formula, such as that of Black and Scholes, to 
estimate the value of a MYP contract option. However, this is only reasonable if the 
contingent pay-offs behave within the constraints and assumptions behind the BS model. 
Though the basic BS formula applies to dividend protected European options in an arbitrage 
free market, it could be applied to a real option if its value depends on: the underlying asset 
value (S); the asset’s volatility (σ); and whether the option time frame resembles that of a 
European option33.   
The worth of the MYP contract option depends on the value of the underlying asset—i.e. the 
net present value of future cash flow implied by the procurements. The uncertainty around 
the size of these cash flows is also a key value driver: low risk SYP contracts have less risk to 
be transferred to the government and lower the contractor’s need for an MYP. Later we will 
discuss in more detail how to assess the volatility(the standard deviation of the market price 
of an asset) of the value of a series SYP contracts. Unlike equity stocks, currencies, and other 
traded securities, volatility in the case of a real option is difficult if not impossible to observe 
so we need to find a suitable tracking asset. The option pricing models can still be used to 
value the real option using the tracking asset’s volatility if there is sufficient correlation 
between the tracking asset and the real option underlying asset valuation fluctuations.  
The time frame of the MYP contract option is reasonably close to a European option, since it 
can be exercised only when the contract is executed. Also inherent in the BS model is that 
the return process of the underlying asset follows a Brownian motion process where the 
returns have a lognormal distribution.  
8. The Black-Scholes model 
The value of the put option p on Company A’s stock at time t until expiration at time T can 
be estimated using the BS model: 
 p(S,t) = Xe− r(T-t)N(-d2) - SN(-d1)  (1) 
S and X are A’s stock spot price at valuation and strike (at expiry T) per share respectively. 
N(d1)  and N(d2)  are the cumulative normal distributions of d1 and d2: 
d1 = (ln(S/X) + (r + σ2/2)(T-t))/ (σ (T-t)1/2) 
d2 = d1- σ (T-t)1/2 
                                                 
33 European options can only be exercised on the expiration data while American options 
can be exercised on or before expiry. 
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σ is the standard deviation or volatility of A’s stock price over the span of the option life34. r 
is the interest rate of a risk-free bond with the tenor of the option expiry. Note that the thin 
dotted curve in Figure 1 never goes below zero; an option has value until expiry even if it is 
out of the money (i.e. for a put, S>X). This value is derived from the “time value” or 
asymmetric opportunity value of the option which allows the holder the possibility that it 
will come into the money prior to expiry without any risk of negative payoff. 
The BS model assumes that the stock price changes are log-normally distributed, such that 
over time, the logarithm of the price changes follows a Weiner process. With the use of Ito’s 
theorem and several more assumptions, the put option price p, as a function of S, is 
calculated using (1)35. In contrast to no-dividend European options assumed in (1) American 
options can be exercised up to or on the expiry date greatly complicating the mathematics 
behind their valuation. Most single equity options are American, while options on indices, 
such as the S&P 500, are European.  
Applying (1) to the MYP,  S is the net present value (NPV) of the cash flow expected from a 
series of SYP contracts; X is the price of the NPV of the MYP contract cash flows;  and T is 
last day the final lot could be changed under an SYP. σ would ideally be the volatility of the 
NPV of the SYP cash flows, but since this volatility is virtually impossible to observe, it will 
be estimated using the contractor’s stock as a tracking asset. 
9. Exchange option 
The exchange option allows the holder the right to swap cash flow x2 (the risky SYP profit 
stream) for cash flow x1 (the less risky MYP profit stream). This option is more general and 
better captures some of the flexibility the government has with actual MYP contract terms. 
The BS-based formula to value an exchange option is:  
 w = e− r(T-t)x’1N(d1) − e− r(T-t)x’2N(d2)  (2) 
Again r is the risk-free rate, x’1 the strike price of asset 1 (MYP), x’2 the strike price of asset 2 
(SYP), and N(d1)  and N(d2)  are the cumulative normal distributions of d1 and d2: 
d1 = (ln(x1/x2)+(σ’2/2)(T-t))/ (σ’ (T-t)1/2) 
d2 = d1- σ’ (T-t)1/2 
σ’ = ( σ12 + σ22 - 2 ρσ1 σ2)1/2 
                                                 
34 Technically it is the instantaneous volatility – something that is hard to measure. 
35 p(S,t) is found by solving the following partial differential equation: 
 pt = ½ σ2S2pSS + rSpS – rp 
The equation is subject to the terminal condition: p=max[0,X-S], and to upper and lower 
boundary conditions: p=Xe-rT for S=0 and p=0 for S→∞. S follows the Wiener process 
through the following stochastic differential equation: dS = μSdt+σSdz.  Here μ is the 
average growth rate; σ is the standard deviation of this growth process; and r is the risk free 
interest rate. 
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Where σ12 is the variance of x1, σ22 is the variance of x2, and ρ is the correlation between x1 
and x2. Here ρ is likely to be close to 1 since x1 and x2 are essentially the same assets whose 
risks are derived from the same source. In our base analysis, x1 is assumed to be certain, i.e. 
the MYP units are fixed in each lot and the government has no flexibility to cancel the MYP. 
Thus σ’ = σ2 since σ1 = 0. If however, the MYP contract has some uncertainty, e.g. from a VIQ 
clause or a low termination fee, σ1 could be adjusted to reflect the relative risk between x1 
and x2.   
The exchange option can also be thought of as a simultaneous call option on asset 1 with 
strike price x2 and a put option on asset 2 with a strike price x1. A call option is a contract 
that gives the owner the right to buy an asset at a predetermined price on or before a 
predetermined time. The main difference between the put and exchange options is that the 
latter allows both assets to have price volatility. Furthermore the exchange option allows for 
the upside volatility in the MYP, i.e. that more units than the original plan could be 
purchased. 
10. Estimating option pricing parameters 
Consider as an example a major acquisition weapon system, “Program G,”, executed by the 
contractor Company A.  Program G and Company A do not correspond directly to any real-
life program or company, although the numbers discussed in this paper are constructed 
from real examples.  Program G’s base SYP net cash flows can be derived from the relevant 
military service’s Selective Acquisition Report (SAR). Table 1 lists the profits associated with 
Program G system lots 6 through 1036. Since lot 6 is the first year of both contract scenarios 
its profits are omitted from the analysis since they will not depend on whether the MYP is 
executed. The SYP uncertainty is only in lots 7 through 10.  The profits are stated in “then 
year” (nominal) terms and the net present value of the flows is discounted at Company A’s 
cost of capital. 
 
Lot 6   $                 -    
 Lot 7                  200  
 Lot 8                  200  
 Lot 9                  250  
 Lot 10                 175  
 Total Profit   $             825  
  
 Present Value   $             630 
Table 3. Contractor SYP Profit ($ Mils) 
The present value total of $630 resents the projected total asset value (x2) of the last four lots 
of the SYP. We initially restrict x2 = x1, or that the option be “at the money”37. 
                                                 
36 We assume a dollar for dollar profit cash flow conversion.  
37 This is a realistic assumption since the number of units in the MYP and SYP are assumed 
to be the same in the standard business case analysis. 
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11. Volatility 
For most non-traded assets, such as the profits of Program G, even the historical volatility is 
difficult to measure38. To properly use the BS model to value Program G MYP option it is 
imperative to find a traded tracking asset whose volatility is highly correlated to the implied 
volatility of the asset underlying the embedded real option. 
Fortunately, Company A’s equity is publicly traded. Company A is a moderately diversified 
government contractor with two divisions, Defense and Non-Defense, that serve different 
government sectors:. We find from their financial statements that Program G represents a 
substantial share of the Defense Division’s earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). The EBIT 
breakout by division is presented in Table 2. The Defense Division has contributed a 
significant portion of the total profits, particularly in recent years. Comparing Tables 1 and 2 
we can see that Program G represents over half of the Defense Division’s historical EBIT.  
 
Year 
Non-
Defense 
Defense Total Stock Price 
  EBIT % Total   
2001 $     758 $     242 24% $   1,000 $       13 
2002        564          92 14%         656            7 
2003        522        128 20%         650          13 
2004        652        123 16%         775          20 
2005        679        167 20%         846          19 
2006        552        257 32%         809          19 
2007        443        335 43%         778          21 
2008        742        370 33%      1,113          26 
Table 2. A’s EBIT Breakdown by Division ($ Mils except for Stock Prices - $/Share) 
Company A is a large enterprise, and while Program G contributes significant profits 
towards to total corporate profit, it is not necessarily enough to drive the overall equity 
performance. Before we can assign Company A’s equity volatility as a tracking asset for 
Program G, we need to establish a closer linkage.  Table 3 shows Company A’s earnings 
growth and volatility by division as well as the market performance of its equity from 2000 
to 2007. We see that the Defense Division tracks the overall stock performance better than 
the Non-Defense Division, and better than the company as a whole. This may be because 
Company A is often identified as a defense company and its stock price, which is forward 
looking, trades on the trends in the overall defense industry.  
 
 
Non-
Defense 
Defense Total Stock 
Growth  0% 6% 2% 10% 
 Volatility (σ) 29% 36% 22% 37% 
Table 3. A’s EBIT Growth and Volatility by Division 2001 to 2008 
                                                 
38 A crude estimate could be constructed by collecting the annual Selected Acquisition 
Report estimates for the number of units funded through the life of the program. 
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One more indication that Company A’s stock is a good tracking asset for Program G is the 
correlation between the division’s EBIT and the stock price, as shown in Table 4. Defense 
Division EBIT has a 72% correlation to the stock price—even higher than the company’s 
total EBIT. Note that this is not to imply that the stock price drives Program G profit 
volatility; but rather that the stock price mirrors the EBIT volatility of the Defense division 
which is strongly driven by the program G business. Since we cannot measure Program G 
EBIT volatility directly, we will use the stock price volatility as a proxy. We could use the 
Defense division’s historical EBIT volatility (Table 3) to track Defense division volatility, 
instead we prefer to use the forward-looking implied volatility estimated in Table 5. 
 
 ρDivision,Stock Price 
Non-
Defense 
18% 
Defense 72% 
Total 59% 
Table 4. Correlation between Stock Price and Division EBIT from 2001 to 2008 
12. Time horizon 
We have already hinted at the time horizon for the MYP option. It starts when congress 
gives the services authority to enter into an MYP with A. It expires at the beginning of the 
last year or lot of production (assuming one lot per fiscal year) since that would be the last 
point at which the government could have reduced the number of units in an SYP contract. 
Assume that the MYP authority is granted six months prior to negotiation. The total life of 
the MYP is then five years and six months.  
13. Interest rate 
The risk free interest rate used in the analysis is the rate on a Treasury bill whose maturity 
ties roughly to the expiry of the MYP option.  
14. Option valuation 
First we estimate the implied volatility of a Company A call option that expires close to the 
MYP expiry. Unfortunately options beyond two years are rare, even for established 
companies like A. Thus we use the Jan ’10 call option to estimate the implied volatility. The 
parameters to estimate the implied volatility are listed in Table 6. S*, X*, T*, and c* are the 
stock price, strike price, expiry, and option price for the A Jan ’10 $25 call. Using these 
values in the BS call option formula we can calculate the implied asset volatility39. The asset 
volatilities are then used in (2) to estimate the exchange option price for the MYP.  
Table 6 summarizes the valuation of the MYP structured as an at-the-money exchange 
option. Setting the strike value equal to the spot value gives an option value of $127 million 
which the contractor would need to pay the government upon executing the MYP contract. 
                                                 
39 We use an algorithm based on the Newton-Raphson method to solve for the implied 
volatility of a European option.  
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Much of this value is in the time to expiration or “time premium”. Just to illustrate, if the 
option were for one month it would be worth $20 million and worth $4 million if it was for 
one day—all else equal. 
 
Risk Free Rate (r) 4.73%
Stock Price (S*)  $    26.15 
Exercise Price (X*) $    25.00   
Expiry (years) (T*) 1 2/3  
Option Price (c*)  $     5.40 
Asset Volatility 29%
Table 5. BS Parameters for A ($/Share) 
 ($ Millions)
 Present Value SYP (x2)  $             630 
 Strike Value (x1)                 630 
 Real Option Price  $             127 
 Expiry (yr)                  5.0 
Table 6. MYP Evaluated as an Exchange Option – Risk on SYP Cash Flow Only 
The analogy between MYP and insurance is a good one because, as anyone who has made a 
claim might have discovered, the insurance pay-off is not certain. The MYP can have a 
variation-in-quantity clause that allows the government to reduce the number of units by a 
pre-determined number. For example, if the EPA clause is activated by unanticipated labor 
and materials inflation, the government might reduce the quantity purchased to maintain its 
bottom line budget. Thus there is some uncertainty around the MYP that must be 
considered in our risk transfer pricing. This is where the exchange option framework has an 
advantage over the plain put option structure. It can be used to value cash flow trades that 
have different levels of uncertainty. For the valuation in Table 6 we set σ’ = σ1 and σ2 = 0.  
Assume now the government and the contractor agree that the former could reduce the 
number of Program G units by 2 each year or 10% of the number of units in each lot. We use 
the exchange option structure to value the right to swap the SYP cash flow with volatility σ1 
for the MYP volatility of volatility σ2 –see Table 7 for the valuation.  
 
 $ Millions
Present Value SYP (x2)  $             630 
Strike Value (x1)  $             630 
Real Option Price  $             112 
Combined Volatility (σ) 26%
SYP Volatility (σ2) 29%
MYP Volatility (σ1) 10%
SYP / MYP Volatility Correlation (ρ) 50%
Table 7. MYP Evaluated as an Exchange Option with Risk on Both Cash Flows 
The price of the option falls from $127 million to $112 million. It would drop to $84 million 
with 100% correlation; however, if there were no correlation between the two cash flows, the 
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price would have increased to $134 million. This is due to the upside potential of the MYP 
and SYP. The exchange option is essentially a put option with a stochastic strike price which 
allows the protection buyer to capture more payoff if the MYP turns out to yield more units. 
This assumes that the risk of the MYP is symmetric.  There is no reason to believe otherwise, 
since the government can always buy more units than planned, if they are needed.  
15. Other real options embedded in an MYP 
Within this chapter, we only have the scope to focus on a single real option example within 
the MYP contract. However, there is at least one other real option available to the contractor 
with a sole source production franchise such as a major aircraft, missile, ship, etc. This is 
because defense contracts are incomplete leaving the contractor with residual control of cost 
reduction innovations. While we will not estimate the value of this real option here, we 
mention it because in some cases it is potentially worth far more than the revenue 
stabilization discussed here. 
Regulatory lag is an incentive concept that emerged from explicitly regulated industries 
such as utilities. These industries’ profits are regulated directly through rate setting, e.g. 
$/kWhr, or through rate of return settings by a regulatory authority. Between rate settings, 
the utility is free to innovate and achieve higher profits. Upon the next regulatory oversight 
review, the regulator discovers the new cost structure and adjusts the new rate accordingly 
to a lower profit level-presumably slightly above the weighted average cost of capital for the 
utility. Longer periods between regulatory oversight periods (i.e. higher regulatory lag), 
mean greater opportunities for higher profits.  
Similarly, a defense contractor with a sole source series of production contracts for a weapon 
system has the incentive to achieve greater than expected efficiency innovations even if the 
savings are passed on to the government in subsequent contracts. It turns out that there is a 
substantial regulatory lag in defense contracts due to the length of time it takes for cost 
reports to be submitted to the government. The regulatory lag increases substantially in a 
MYP contract.  
These innovations are real options since the contractor is not obligated to make the 
necessary investment to achieve the cost savings. They can use real options valuation tool to 
estimate the worth of these options before a program is executed by looking at prior history 
of achieving cost reduction innovations as well as a forward looking assessment of the 
opportunities in a specific weapon system. Unlike the revenue stabilization option, there is 
considerable information asymmetry between the government and contractor with the 
regulatory lag options. However, the government could look at prior programs and assess 
the degree of regulatory lag driven innovation that occurred in past programs and roughly 
estimate the value of this type of incentive on a new program. This valuation can provide 
important insight into how aggressively contractors will compete to win a large sole source 
program.  
16. Conclusion: the cost implications of the MYP option 
Options pricing analysis offers a way to systematically estimate value from the MYP 
contract earned by the Government for which they have not previously been explicitly 
compensated. This incremental value is the revenue risk transferred to the Government 
from the contractor upon signing an MYP. The MYP does not eliminate the revenue risk for 
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the contractor associated with SYP contracts; rather it transfers it to the government and it 
becomes budget risk. The Congress clearly values its budget flexibility, as evidenced by the 
statutory criteria to judge the worth of an MYP proposal.  
MYP cost savings are usually through operational efficiencies earned through process and 
purchasing improvements funded by the Government’s “economic order quantity” advance 
funding. The transfer of revenue risk to the Government is a cash flow hedge that provides 
real value to the contractor just as any financial hedge does for currency, commodity, or 
interest rate risks--or property and casualty insurance does for operational risks. Lockheed 
and Raytheon, for example, carry interest rate swaps that hedge interest rate risk for 
notional $1 billion and $600 million respectively40,41. General Dynamics reported a currency 
swap to hedge a Canadian denominated loan with a fair value of $42 million42. It also 
reported embedded options in the terms of its long term labor and commodity contracts.  
One can argue that just as public companies are expected to incur expenses as they pay for 
insurance and financial hedges, they should pay the government when it reduces the 
contractor’s risk.  
The option methodology helps the government objectively quantify some of the cost in 
relinquishing its budget flexibility with a relatively simple tool that has widespread use in 
the financial community. We do not try to value the cost of transferring the risk from the 
Government’s side because there is not a readily available tracking asset to estimate the 
volatility of the revenue risk. It is possible to estimate the actuarial loss history of certain 
procurements by looking at the Selected Acquisition Report over the span of past programs. 
If such data were available, it might be desirable to use it in lieu of the equity volatility of 
the contractor. One benefit of using the contractor’s volatility, however, is that it is more 
closely coupled to the risk the contractor might be willing to hedge. 
The option value of the MYP has not been explicitly paid to the government in the past. 
Thus any method that helps rationalize the cost of this risk transfer is a benefit to the 
government. Furthermore, the contractor will likely see the value of the MYP option if it is 
evaluated in its own financial terms. 
Strategically, the MYP option value represents a significant reduction in the contractor’s 
profits. Given the skill and sophistication that contractors employ to manage their 
government customers, they will likely argue that the MYP real option has limited value as 
an earnings hedge. They could contend that financial hedges are only appropriate for risks 
that are outside of managers’ control, such as interest and exchange rates, and cannot be 
offset within the business. They might also contend that not only is their portfolio of 
business well diversified among a broad scope of government elements but that they have 
enough support on Capitol Hill to ensure that they will sell all the units in the SYP plan. 
They would be arguing that the program is less risky than their business in total (i.e. their 
equity volatility). This would be a difficult argument for most businesses. However, initially 
it is unlikely the contractors will proactively volunteer to pay for it. 
                                                 
40 Lockheed Martin Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, 
Commission file number 1-11437, Fiscal Year December 31, 2006, p.71. 
41 Raytheon Company, Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, Commission file 
number 1-13699, Fiscal Year December 31, 2006, p. 74. 
42 General Dynamics Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, 
Commission file number 1-13671, Fiscal Year December 31, 2006, p. 49. 
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However, the fact is that the lower earnings risk from an MYP has tangible value whether or 
not the contractors wish to pay for it. The option has the same value no matter what the 
contractors’ risk preference. If there is no risk hedge in an MYP, why do the contractors 
routinely enter into this type of contract? In fact Lockheed readily acknowledged that the 
value of the MYP is its long term stability43.  
The options methodology allows the Government to build a logical business case for 
reducing the profit on cost paid to contractors when switching from an SYP series to an 
MYP contract. The exchange option model in particular allows the Government to quickly 
estimate changes in the value of the contract as the details, e.g. the EPA and VIQ clauses, 
become more complete.  
17. References 
Amram, M., and K. N. Howe (2003), “Real Options Valuations: Taking Out the Rocket 
Science,” Strategic Finance, Feb. 2003, 10-13. 
Baldi, F. (2005), “Valuing a Leveraged Buyout: Expansion of the Adjusted Present Value by 
Means of Real Options Analysis,” J. Private Equity, Fall 2005, 64-81. 
Barnett, M. L. (2005), “Paying Attention to Real Options,” R&D Management 35, 61-72. 
Black, F. and M. Scholes (1973), “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,” J. 
Political Economy 81, 637-654. 
Charnes, J. M., and B. R. Cobb (2004), “Telecommunications Network Evolution Decisions: 
Using Crystal Ball and Optiquest for Real Options Valuation,” Proc. 2004 Crystal 
Ball User Conference. 
Colwell, D., T. Henker, J. Ho, and K. Fong (2003), “Real Options Valuation of Australian 
Gold Mines and Mining Companies,” J. Alternative Investments, Summer 2003, 23-
38. 
Copeland, T., and K. M. Howe (2002), “Real Options and Strategic Decisions,” Strategic 
Finance, April 2002, 8-11. 
Copeland, T., and P. Tufano (2004), “A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options,” Harvard 
Business Review, March 2004, 90-99. 
Cornelius, P., A. Van de Putte, and M. Romani (2005), “Three Decades of Scenario Planning 
at Shell,” California Management Review 48, 92-109. 
Duan, C. W., W. T. Lin, and C. F. Lee (2003), “Sequential Capital Budgeting as Real Options: 
The Case of a New DRAM Chipmaker in Taiwan,” Rev. Pacific Basin Financial 
Markets and Policies, 6, 1, 87-112. 
Ekelund, A. (2005), “Valuating Biotech Project Portfolios Using Crystal Ball and Real 
Options-Case: Natimmune,” Proc. 2005 Crystal Ball User Conference. 
Ford, D. N., D. M. Lander, and J. Voyer (2002), “A Real Options Approach to Valuing 
Strategic Flexibility in Uncertain Construction Projects,” Construction Management 
and Economics 20, 343-351. 
Fourt, R. (2004), Risk and Optimal Timing in a Real Estate Development Using Real Options 
Analysis, Proc. 2004 Crystal Ball User Conference. 
                                                 
43 LMT-Q3 2006 Lockheed Martin Earnings Conference Call, Preliminary Transcript, 
Thompson StreetEvents, Thompson Financial, October 24, 2006, 11:00AM ET 
www.intechopen.com
 Aerospace Technologies Advancements 
 
492 
Gaynor, M. and S. Bradner (2001), “Using Real Options to Value Modularity in Standards,” 
Knowledge, Technology and Policy 14, 2, 41-66. 
Herath, H., and C. S. Park (2002), “Multi-Stage Capital Investment Opportunities as 
Compound Real Options,” The Engineering Economist 47, 1-27. 
IOMA (2001), “Real Options Analysis Creeps into Use at Intel, Genentech, and Texaco,” 
IOMA’s Report on Financial Analysis, Planning & Reporting 01-12, 5-11. 
Janney, J. and G. G. Dess (2004), “Can Real-Options Analysis Improve Decision-Making? 
Promises and Pitfalls,” Academy of Management Executive, 18, 4, 60-75. 
Kayali, M. M. (2006), “Real Options as a Tool for Making Strategic Investment Decisions,” J. 
American Academy of Business 8, 282-286. 
Laxman, P. R. and S. Aggarwal (2003), “Patent Valuation Using Real Options,” IIMB 
Management Review, Dec. 2003, 44-51. 
MacMillan, I., A. B. van Putten, R. G. McGrath, and J. D. Thompson (2006), Using Real 
Options Discipline for Highly Uncertain Technology Investments,” Research-
Technology Management, Jan.-Feb. 2006, 29-37. 
Maumo, D. A. (2005), “HP Applies Risk Management to Procurement,” Manufacturing and 
Business Technology, Nov. 2005, 26-27. 
Nembhard, H. B., L. Shi, and M. Aktan (2003), “A Real Options Design for Product 
Outsourcing,” The Engineering Economist, 41, 3, 199-217. 
Oppenheimer, P. H. (2002), “A Critique of Using Real Options Pricing Models in Valuing 
Real Estate Projects and Contracts,” Briefings in Real Estate Finance 2, 3, 221-233. 
Paxson, D. (2002) (ed.) “Real R&D Options,” Butterworth Heinemann, 333pp. 
Remer, S., S. H. Ang, and C. Baden-Fuller (2001), “Dealing with Uncertainty in the 
Biotechnology Industry: The Use of Real Options Reasoning,” J. Commercial 
Biotechnology 8, 2, 95-105. 
Rigby, D. (2001), “Management Tools 2001-Global,” Bain and Co., Boston, Massachusetts, 
June, 2001. 
Rigby, D. and B. Bilodeau (2005), “Management Tools and Trends 2005,” Bain and Co., 
Boston, Massachusetts. 
Rothwell, G. (2006), “A Real Options Approach to Evaluating New Nuclear Power Plants,” 
Energy Journal 27, 37-53. 
Synergy Partners (2003), “Real Options Primer,” Synergy Partners, Greensboro, North 
Carolina. 
Teach, E. (2003), “Will Real Options Take Root?” CFO, July 2003, 73-76. 
van Putten, A. B., and I. C. MacMillan (2004), “Making Real Options Really Work,” Harvard 
Business Review, Dec. 2004, 134-141. 
www.intechopen.com
Aerospace Technologies Advancements
Edited by Thawar T. Arif
ISBN 978-953-7619-96-1
Hard cover, 492 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 01, January, 2010
Published in print edition January, 2010
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
Space technology has become increasingly important after the great development and rapid progress in
information and communication technology as well as the technology of space exploration. This book deals
with the latest and most prominent research in space technology. The first part of the book (first six chapters)
deals with the algorithms and software used in information processing, communications and control of
spacecrafts. The second part (chapters 7 to 10) deals with the latest research on the space structures. The
third part (chapters 11 to 14) deals with some of the latest applications in space. The fourth part (chapters 15
and 16) deals with small satellite technologies. The fifth part (chapters 17 to 20) deals with some of the latest
applications in the field of aircrafts. The sixth part (chapters 21 to 25) outlines some recent research efforts in
different subjects. 
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Scot A. Arnold and Marius S. Vassiliou (2010). A Real Options Approach to Valuing the Risk Transfer in a
Multi-Year Procurement Contract, Aerospace Technologies Advancements, Thawar T. Arif (Ed.), ISBN: 978-
953-7619-96-1, InTech, Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/aerospace-technologies-
advancements/a-real-options-approach-to-valuing-the-risk-transfer-in-a-multi-year-procurement-contract
© 2010 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
